Although deep neural networks have been successful in image classification, they are prone to adversarial attacks. To generate misclassified inputs, there has emerged a wide variety of techniques, such as black-and whitebox testing of neural networks. In this paper, we present DeepSearch, a novel blackbox-fuzzing technique for image classifiers. Despite its simplicity, DeepSearch is shown to be more effective in finding adversarial examples than closely related black-and whitebox approaches. DeepSearch is additionally able to generate the most subtle adversarial examples in comparison to these approaches.
Sect. 4, we extend our technique further such that the generated adversarial examples are more subtle. We present our experimental evaluation in Sect. 5, discuss related work in Sect. 6, and conclude in Sect. 7.
FUZZING BINARY CLASSIFIERS
In this section, we present the technical details of how DeepSearch fuzzes (linear and non-linear) binary classifiers.
Linear Binary Classifiers
In the following, we review background on linear binary classifiers, give an intuition on how our technique fuzzes their inputs through an example, and present our methodology in detail.
Background. A binary classifier classifies inputs into two classes, denoted with labels C 2 = {l 1 , l 2 }, according to the definition below.
Definition 1 (Binary Classifier). Given a classification function f : R n → R, a binary classifier N f : R n → C 2 is defined as follows:
If function f is linear, then N f is a linear binary classifier, otherwise it is non-linear.
The set of values D f = {x | f (x) = 0} constitute the decision boundary of N f , which classifies the domain R n into the two classes in C 2 . As an example, consider Fig. 1a , showing a linear binary classifier N f : R 2 → C 2 . (The red dashed and dash-dotted lines should be ignored for now.) Observe that input x 0 is classified in l 1 whereas x ′ 0 is in l 2 . Note that the decision boundary of a linear classifier N f : R n → C 2 is a hyperplane; it is, therefore, a straight line in Fig. 1a .
Given a binary classifier N f and a correctly classified input x, there exists an adversarial example in the set of inputs within distance d ∈ R of x, denoted B(x, d), if and only if another input x ′ ∈ B(x, d) is classified differently than x. In other words, x ′ is an adversarial example if N f (x) N f (x ′ ), which is equivalent to f (x)f (x ′ ) < 0. For example, assume that input x 0 = (x h , x v ) in Fig. 1a is correctly classified and that the dash-dotted square represents B(x, d). Then, x ′ 0 is an adversarial example. Example. We give an intuition on how DeepSearch handles linear binary classifiers using the example of Fig. 1a . Recall that x 0 is a correctly classified input for which f (x 0 ) > 0. To find an adversarial example, DeepSearch fuzzes x 0 with the goal of generating a new input x ′ 0 such that f (x ′ 0 ) < 0. Fuzzing is performed as follows. Input x 0 has two coordinates x h and x v , for the horizontal and vertical dimensions. DeepSearch independently mutates each of these coordinates to the minimum and maximum values that are possible within B(x 0 , d), with the intention to find the minimum value of f on B(x 0 , d). For instance, when mutating x h , we obtain inputs x 0 [l h /x h ] and x 0 [u h /x h ] in the figure. Values l h and u h are, respectively, the minimum and maximum that x h may take, and x 0 [l h /x h ] denotes substituting x h with l h (similarly for x 0 [u h /x h ]). We then evaluate f (x 0 [l h /x h ]) and f (x 0 [u h /x h ]), and for x h , we select the value (l h or u h ) that causes function f to decrease. This is because, in our example, an adversarial input x ′ 0 must make the value of f negative. Let us assume that f (x 0 [u h /x h ]) < f (x 0 [l h /x h ); we, thus, select u h for coordinate x h .
DeepSearch mutates coordinate x v in a similar way. It evaluates f (x 0 [l v /x v ]) and f (x 0 [u v /x v ]), and selects the value that causes f to decrease. Let us assume that f (
we, thus, select u v for x v .
Next, we generate input x ′ 0 by substituting each coordinate in x 0 with the boundary value that was previously selected. In other words,
, and since f (x ′ 0 ) < 0, DeepSearch has generated an adversarial example. Note that f (x ′ 0 ) is actually the minimum value of f on B(x 0 , d).
DeepSearch for linear binary classifiers. We now formalize how DeepSearch treats linear binary classifiers. Consider a linear classification function
Note that f is monotonic with respect to all of its variables x 1 , ..., x n . For instance, if w i > 0, then f is monotonically increasing in x i .
Recall that B(x, d) denotes the set of inputs within distance d ∈ R of an input x. B(x, d) may be represented by an n-dimensional cube
We write f (I) for the values of f on I:
Due to the monotonicity of f , the maximum and minimum values of f on I may be easily calculated by applying f to vertices of I: Theorem 1. Given a linear classification function f (x) = w T x +b, where w T = (w 1 , ..., w n ) and b ∈ R, an n-dimensional cube I = I 1 × ... × I n , where I i = [l i , u i ] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and an input x ∈ I, we have:
According to the above theorem, we can precisely calculate the minimum and maximum values of f in any n-dimensional cube. In particular, assume a correctly classified input x for which f (x) > 0.
To generate a new input x ′ , we select the value of its ith coordinate as follows:
As shown here, selecting a value for x ′ (i) requires evaluating function f twice, i.e., f (x[l i /x i ]) and f (x[u i /x i ]). Therefore, for n dimensions, f must be evaluated 2n times. In practice however, due to the monotonicity of f , evaluating it only once per dimension is sufficient. For instance, if f (x[u i /x i ]) already decreases (resp. increases) the value of f in comparison to f (x), there is no need to evaluate f (x[l i /x i ]). Value u i (resp. l i ) should be selected for the ith coordinate. Hence, the minimum value of f can be computed by evaluating the function exactly n times. If, for the newly generated input x ′ , the sign of f becomes negative, x ′ constitutes an adversarial example.
We treat the case where f (x) < 0 for a correctly classified input x analogously. DeepSearch aims to generate a new input x ′ such that the sign of f becomes positive. We are, therefore, selecting coordinate values that cause f to increase.
Non-Linear Binary Classifiers
We generalize our technique to non-linear binary classifiers. In this setting, DeepSearch iteratively approximates the minimum and maximum values of f in B(x, d).
Example. As an example, consider the non-linear classification function f shown in Fig. 1b . Since f is non-linear, the decision boundary D f of the binary classifier is a curve.
Starting from correctly classified input x 0 , DeepSearch treats f as linear within B(x 0 , d) and generates x 1 , exactly as it would for a linear binary classifier. Observe that input x 1 is not adversarial. Unlike for a linear binary classifier however, where the minimum value of f in B(x 0 , d) is precisely computed, the non-linear case is handled by iteratively approximating the minimum. In particular, after generating x 1 , DeepSearch iterates starting from x 1 , while again treating f as linear in B(x 0 , d). As a result, our technique generates input x 2 , which is adversarial.
DeepSearch for non-linear binary classifiers. Alg. 1 shows DeepSearch for binary classifiers. It uses iterative approximations to search for adversarial examples. Note that our technique is blackbox, and consequently, it cannot differentiate between linear and nonlinear classifiers. Alg. 1 is, therefore, the general algorithm that DeepSearch applies to fuzz any binary classifier.
The main function in Alg. 1 is DS-Binary. Input x init is the input from which we start the first iteration, e.g., it corresponds to x 0 in Fig. 1 . Input x is used to compute B(x, d), and for now, assume that x is equal to x init . (We will discuss why x is needed in Sect. 4.) In addition to these inputs, the algorithm also takes a classification function f and the distance d. If it terminates, it returns an adversarial example x ′ .
Function DS-Binary first assigns x init to x 0 and constructs n intervals I 1 , ..., I n to represent B(x 0 , d) (lines 20-21). Then, based on the sign of f (x 0 ), our algorithm iteratively approximates the minimum (lines [23] [24] [25] [26] or the maximum (lines 28-31) value of f in B(x 0 , d). Each iteration evaluates f 2n times (see Sect. 2.1).
Algorithm 1:
DeepSearch for binary classifiers.
10 Function ApproxMin(x, f , (I 1 , ..., I n )) is 11 x ′ := (0, ..., 0) DS-Binary terminates when an adversarial example is found. If such an example is found in k iterations, we evaluate f 2nk times. Note that, in practice, we set a bound on the number of iterations, which we discuss in Sect. 5.
ApproxMin and ApproxMax implement Thm. 1 to calculate the minimum and maximum values of function f in the n-dimensional cube I 1 × ... × I n . When f is linear, calling these functions on any input x ∈ I 1 ×...×I n does not affect the computation. In other words, the minimum and maximum values are precisely computed for any x. When f is non-linear, it is still assumed to be linear within the n-dimensional cube. Given that the size of the cube is designed to be small, this assumption does not introduce too much imprecision. As a consequence of this assumption however, different inputs in the n-dimensional cube lead to computing different minimum and maximum values of f . For instance, in Fig. 1b , calling ApproxMin on x 0 returns x 1 , while calling it on x 1 returns x 2 .
In this section, we extend our technique for blackbox fuzzing of binary classifiers to multiclass classifiers.
Linear Multiclass Classifiers
Background. A multiclass classifier classifies inputs in m classes according to the following definition. 
In other words, a multiclass classifier N f classifies an input x in l j if f j (x) evaluates to the largest value in comparison to all other functions f i .
Function f of a multiclass classifier N f may be decomposed into multiple binary classifiers such that the original multiclass classifier may be reconstructed from these binary classifiers. First, to decompose a multiclass classifier into binary classifiers, for any pair of classes l i and l j (
. We then construct a binary classifier N д i j : R n → {l i , l j } as follows:
As usual, the set of values
constitutes the pairwise decision boundary of binary classifier N д i j , which classifies the domain R n into the two classes {l i , l j }. As an example, consider Fig. 2a depicting a multiclass classifier N f :
Assume that N f correctly classifies input x in l 2 . Based on the above, linear binary classifiers N д 21 and N д 23 also classify x in l 2 , i.e., д 21 (x) > 0 and д 23 (x) > 0. Second, a multiclass classifier may be composed from multiple binary classifiers as follows. An input x is classified in class l i by multiclass classifier N f if and only if it is classified in l i by all m − 1 binary classifiers
For instance, in Fig. 2a , if both N д 21 and N д 23 classify input x in class l 2 , then the multiclass classifier also classifies it in l 2 . Based on the above, a multiclass classifier has an adversarial input if and only if this input is also adversarial for a constituent binary classifier: Corollary 1. Let N f be a multiclass classifier and x ∈ R n a correctly classified input, where N f (x) = l i and l i ∈ C m . There exists an adversarial example x ′ ∈ B(x, d) for N f , where d ∈ R, if and only if x ′ is an adversarial example for a binary classifier 
We, therefore, use DeepSearch for binary classifiers to test each binary classifier in this set. If there exists an adversarial input x ′ for one of these classifiers, i.e., N д i j (x ′ ) l i for some j, then x ′ is also an adversarial input for
Let us consider again the example of Fig. 2a . Recall that multiclass classifier N f correctly classifies input x in class l 2 , and so do binary classifiers N д 21 and N д 23 , i.e., д 21 (x) > 0 and д 23 (x) > 0. As a result, DeepSearch tries to generate inputs that decrease the value of each of these functions in B(x, d) in order to find adversarial examples. Function д 21 evaluates to its minimum value in B(x, d) for input x ′ 1 , and function д 23 for input x ′ 3 . Observe that x ′ 3 is an adversarial example for N д 23 , and thus also for N f , whereas x ′ 1 is not. DeepSearch for linear multiclass classifiers. Let us assume a linear classification function f (
For any pair of class labels l i and l j , function д i j is defined as
Hence, д i j is also linear, and N д i j is a linear binary classifier.
Assume that classifier N f correctly classifies input
To find an adversarial example for a binary classifier
To generate a new input x ′ j for which function д i j evaluates to its minimum value, we select its kth coordinate as follows:
Note that, although we calculate the minimum value of m − 1 linear functions, we still evaluate f 2n times. This is because a Algorithm 2: DeepSearch for multiclass classifiers.
are the values of f (x) for the ith and jth classes, respectively.
If the sign of д i j (x ′ j ) becomes negative for some j, then DeepSearch has found an adversarial example for N f in B(x, d).
Non-Linear Multiclass Classifiers
We now extend our technique to non-linear multiclass classifiers. Analogously to Sect. 2.2, DeepSearch iteratively approximates the minimum values of functions д i j in B(x, d).
Example. As an example, consider Fig. 2b depicting a multiclass classifier N f :
Assume that N f classifies input x 0 in class l 2 , and thus, so do nonlinear binary classifiers N д 21 and N д 23 .
Let us also assume that д 21 (x 0 ) < д 23 (x 0 ). Since д 21 evaluates to a smaller value than д 23 for input x 0 , we consider it more likely to have an adversarial example. In other words, we first approximate the minimum value of д 21 because it is closer to becoming negative for the initial input. DeepSearch treats д 21 as linear within B(x 0 , d) and generates x 1 . Observe that input x 1 is not adversarial. Now, assume that д 21 (x 1 ) > д 23 (x 1 ). As a result, DeepSearch tries to find the minimum of function д 23 in B(x 0 , d), also by treating it as linear. It generates input x 2 , which is an adversarial example for classifiers N д 23 and N f .
DeepSearch for non-linear multiclass classifiers. Alg. 2 is the general DeepSearch algorithm for multiclass classifiers. The inputs are the same as for Alg. 1. For now, assume that x is equal to x init . Again, if the algorithm terminates, it returns an adversarial example for N f in B(x, d).
Function DS-Multiclass assigns x init to x 0 and constructs n intervals I 1 , ..., I n to represent B(x 0 , d). It also computes the class label l i of x 0 , and defines functions д i j (1 ≤ j ≤ m, i j) (lines 2-5). The rest of the algorithm uses ApproxMin from Alg. 1 to iteratively approximate the minimum of one function д i j per iteration. This function is selected on line 7 such that its value for input x k is smaller in comparison to all other constituent binary classification functions. This heuristic allows our algorithm to find an adversarial example faster than having to generate an input x k +1 for all m − 1 functions д i j per iteration. DS-Multiclass terminates when an adversarial example is found. If such an example is found in k iterations, we evaluate f 2nk times.
FUZZING WITH ITERATIVE REFINEMENT
The closer the adversarial examples are to a correctly classified input, the more subtle they are. Such adversarial examples are said to have a low distortion rate. In this section, we extend DeepSearch with an iterative refinement approach for finding subtle adversarial examples. On a high level, given an input x and a distance d, for which we have already found an adversarial example x ′ in region B(x, d), DeepSearch iteratively reduces distance d as long as the smaller region still contains an adversarial example. If none is found, the distance is not reduced further.
For an input x with an ith coordinate
we define a projection operator Proj that maps x to a vertex of I as follows
where Proj(I, x)(i) denotes the ith coordinate of Proj(I, x). As an example, consider Fig. 3a showing a linear multiclass classifier. Input x 2 is a projection of x 1 .
Using the above projector operator, the minimum and maximum values of a linear classification function f may also be projected on I. In particular:
Theorem 2. Let f (x) = w T x +b be a linear classification function, and I 1 , I 2 two n-dimensional cubes such that I 1 ⊆ I 2 . Assuming that x is an input for which f obtains its minimum or maximum value in I 2 , we have:
In Fig. 3a , assume that input x 0 is correctly classified in class l 2 . Then, in region B(x 0 , d 1 ), function д 23 obtains its minimum value for input x 1 . When projecting x 1 to vertex x 2 of B(x 0 , d 2 ), notice that д 23 evaluates to its minimum for input x 2 in this smaller region.
Example. Fig. 3 shows two multiclass classifiers N f : Fig. 3a , function f is linear, whereas in Fig. 3b , it is non-linear. For correctly classified input x 0 , we assume that N f (x 0 ) = l 2 , and thus, N д 21 (x 0 ) = l 2 and N д 23 (x 0 ) = l 2 .
In both subfigures, assume that x 1 is an adversarial example found by DS-Multiclass (see Alg. 2) in B(x 0 , d 1 ). Once such an example is found, our technique with refinement uses bisect search to find the smallest distance d ′ such that the projection of x 1 on B(x 0 , d ′ ) is still adversarial. In Fig. 3 , this distance is d 2 , and input x 2 constitutes the projection of x 1 on B(x 0 , d 2 ). So, x 2 is closer to x 0 , which means that it has a lower distortion rate than x 1 . In fact, since we are using bisect search to determine distance d 2 , x 2 is the closest adversarial input to x 0 that may be generated by projecting x 1 on smaller regions.
However, in region B(x 0 , d 2 ), there may be other vertices that are adversarial and get us even closer to x 0 with projection. To find such examples, we apply DS-Multiclass again, this time starting from input x 2 and searching in region B(x 0 , d 2 ). As a result, we DeepSearch with iterative refinement. Alg. 3 describes our technique with iterative refinement. Each iteration consists of a refinement and a search step, which we explain next.
The refinement step (lines 3-4) first calculates the L ∞ distance d between x and x ′ . In Fig. 3 , input x of the algorithm is x 0 , and x ′ is x 1 . So, x ′ is an adversarial input that was generated by our technique, and consequently, a vertex of B(x, d). On line 4, we use bisect search to find the minimum distance d ′ such that the input derived by projecting x ′ on B(x, d ′ ) is still adversarial. In Fig. 3 , this is distance d 2 , and Proj(B(x, d ′ ), x ′ ) of the algorithm corresponds to adversarial input x 2 in the figure.
Note that this refinement is possible because of Thm. 2, which guarantees that a linear function f evaluates to its minimum in B(x, d ′ ) for the input derived with projection. When f is nonlinear, it might not evaluate to its minimum for adversarial input Proj(B(x, d ′ ), x ′ ). However, it is still the case that this projected input is closer to x, i.e., ||x − Proj(B(x, d ′ ), x ′ )|| L ∞ ≤ ||x − x ′ || L ∞ , and thus, has a lower distortion rate.
The search step (lines 5-8) calls function DS-Binary (Alg. 1) or DS-Multiclass (Alg. 2), depending on whether f is a binary classification function. The goal is to search for another adversarial example (other than Proj(B(x, d ′ ), x ′ )) in region B(x, d ′ ). In Fig. 3 , an adversarial input found by this step, when starting the search from x 2 , is x 3 , which is also a vertex of B(x 0 , d 2 ).
On lines 9-12, we essentially check whether the search step was successful in finding another adversarial input x ′′ . Recall that DS-Binary and DS-Multiclass only terminate when such an input is found, but in practice, we bound their number of iterations. If this bound is reached, they might not return an adversarial example. If they do, like input x 3 in Fig. 3 , the algorithm iterates (line 13). If not, like when starting the search from input x 4 in the figure, which is a projection of x 3 on B(x 0 , d 3 ), then we return the projected input and terminate.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate DeepSearch by using it to test the robustness of deep neural networks trained for popular datasets. We also compare its effectiveness with state-of-the-art black-and Algorithm 3: DeepSearch with iterative refinement. In Sect. 5.3, we present experimental results providing answers to these questions. Note that the fourth question uses the term 'queries' to refer to the number of times we evaluate classification function f , e.g., 2nk times in Algs. 1 and 2. Sects. 5.1 and 5.2 discuss our experimental setup and the metrics we use to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of our technique.
Evaluation Setup
Datasets and network models. We evaluate our approach on deep neural networks trained for two popular datasets, namely MNIST [42] and CIFAR-10 [37] . For MNIST, we trained a LeNet-5 [41] network with 99.2% test accuracy, and for CIFAR-10, a ResNet-32 [28] network with 92.19% test accuracy.
For each dataset, we first randomly selected 1100 images from the test set and carried out our experiments only on the images that were correctly classified by the networks we trained. For MNIST, 1085 images were correctly classified by the LeNet-5 network, and for CIFAR-10, 1024 images by the ResNet-32 network.
Random fuzzing. Random fuzzing is a very simple technique for testing the robustness of a neural network, and in practice, it can prove effective in finding adversarial examples. In the following, we introduce two random-fuzzing approaches that we use as baselines in our experiments. Basic random fuzzing For x ∈ R n and d ∈ R, we generate 6000 images within B(x, d) with random mutations.
Iterative random fuzzing For x ∈ R n and d ∈ R, we perform iterative random fuzzing as follows. (1) Seed-pool initialization: We first generate 1000 images within B(x, d/5) with random mutations. From these, we select the 10 best images. In particular, for f (x) > 0 (resp. f (x) < 0), an image x ′ is selected if f (x ′ ) evaluates to one of the 10 smallest (resp. largest) values of f . (2) Iteration: For each image x ′ in the pool, we generate 100 images within B(x ′ , d/5)∩B(x, d) with random mutations. So, for all seed images, we derive a total of 1000 random images. From these, we then select the 10 best images and populate the pool with them for the next iteration. We iterate 9 times in our experiments.
Existing approaches. We compare DeepSearch with three stateof-the-art approaches for generating adversarial examples, which we describe below.
• The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [24] is a popular whitebox technique, optimized for the L ∞ distance metric.
For an input x, it computes an adversarial example x ′ as
is the loss function, f the classification function, and l the label given to x by f . • The Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [39] , also called iterative FGSM, extends FGSM with iterations. Starting from an image x, each iteration takes a small step α toward the gradient sign and clips the new image such that it is within B(x, ϵ). An adversarial example is computed by
In our experiments, we set α = 1 and allow 120 (resp. 40) iterations for MNIST (resp. CIFAR-10). • Gradient Estimation [5] is a blackbox technique that estimates gradients through queries to f . The effectiveness of single-step gradient estimation (sGE) is known to be comparable to FGSM. We use logits loss [5, 12] for sGE as it is more effective than cross-entropy loss [23] and set δ = 0.001, where δ is a parameter that controls the estimation accuracy of this method.
Query reduction. Recall that for an n-dimensional input x, our technique makes 2n queries per iteration. To reduce this number, we adapt random grouping [5] to our setting:
Note that there might only be l < k remaining indices, in which case we select these.
(2) For each set G i , our technique mutates all coordinates that correspond to indices in the set toward the same direction at the same time. Hence, DeepSearch makes only 2 queries per set, namely
where i 1 , ..., i l ∈ G i and l = |G i |.
Consequently, the total number of queries per iteration reduces to ⌈2 n k ⌉. In our experiments, we show how random grouping affects the effectiveness of DeepSearch.
DeepSearch termination criteria. In our experiments, Alg. 2 terminates when f (x k ) changes in the wrong direction 4 times.
Alg. 3 does not terminate as long as the current iteration decreases the normalized L ∞ distance of adversarial examples by 0.001.
Metrics
To evaluate the effectiveness of DeepSearch, we use the following two metrics.
Misclassification rate. The misclassification rate measures the percentage of input images for which adversarial examples are found. The higher this rate, the more effective a given technique in finding adversarial examples. Assume we write findAdv(x) to denote whether an adversarial example is found for input x. If so, we have that findAdv(x) = 1; Otherwise, we have findAdv(x) = 0. For a set of images X = {x 1 , ..., x k }, the misclassification rate of a given technique is:
Average distortion rate. Let sets X = {x 1 , ..., x k } and X adv = {x ′ 1 , ..., x ′ k } be input images and adversarial examples, respectively. The average distortion rate between X and X adv with respect to the L ∞ distance is:
As shown here, the lower this rate, the more subtle the adversarial examples. For approaches that achieve similar misclassification rates, we use this metric to determine which approach finds more subtle perturbations.
Other metrics. We do not measure time in our experiments; our aim is to show that our blackbox technique is more effective than state-of-the-art whitebox approaches. These approaches are typically fast due to their whitebox nature-they have access to more information about the network under test. So, comparing time would disadvantage DeepSearch.
For comparing iterative approaches, we do not bound the number of iterations to the same fixed value. This is because the notion of an iteration is inherently different across approaches. We, instead, use the same distance metric (L ∞ ) for all approaches.
Experimental Results
In our experiments, we consider the following four variants of DeepSearch:
(1) Single-step DeepSearch (sD) implements Alg. 2 but executes lines 7-9 only once. (2) Iterative DeepSearch (iD) implements Alg. 2 as is (using the termination criterion discussed in Sect. 5.1). (3) DeepSearch with single-step refinement (DsR) implements Alg. 3 but executes lines 3-12 only once. (4) DeepSearch with iterative refinement (DiR) implements Alg. 3 as is (using the termination criterion discussed in Sect. 5.1).
In the rest of this section, we use the following abbreviations and use both cross-entropy loss and logits loss for FGSM and BIM: bRF for basic random fuzzing, iRF for iterative random fuzzing, FGSM-X (resp. FGSM-L) for FGSM with cross-entropy (resp. logits) loss, BIM-X (resp. BIM-L) for BIM with cross-entropy (resp. logits) loss.
Results on misclassification rate. Our experimental results on the misclassification rate of the different techniques are shown in Fig. 4 .
Overall, DeepSearch is significantly more effective than the two random-fuzzing approaches (bRF and iRF). Observe that, for MNIST, random fuzzing is not as effective as for CIFAR-10. In fact, for CIFAR-10, random fuzzing is quite effective for a large L ∞ distance. As shown in the figure, the misclassification rate of bRF (resp. iRF) surpasses the three single-step approaches (sGE, sD, and FGSM) when the distance is greater than 24 (resp. 16) .
When comparing single-step approaches, we observe that singlestep DeepSearch is more effective than sGE and whitebox FGSM for both MNIST and CIFAR-10. For the MNIST model, the advantage of sD is more prominent when the L ∞ distance ranges from 0.15 to 0.4. For this distance range, the misclassification rate of sD is 10-20% higher than sGE and 15-28% higher than FGSM. For CIFAR-10, when the distance ranges from 4 to 16, the difference is again more noticeable. For this range, sD is 1-3% more effective than sGE and 4-7% more effective than FGSM. It is important to note here that sD is more effective than sGE while performing half of the queries to function f . Recall from Sect. 2.1 that, in practice, sD performs n queries, whereas sGE requires 2n.
When comparing iterative approaches, iterative DeepSearch closely matches the effectiveness of whitebox BIM for both models. For the MNIST model, when the L ∞ distance is above 0.2, the misclassification rates of both iD and BIM are close to 100%. The results are similar for CIFAR-10 when the distance is above 4. Despite the comparable effectiveness of iD and BIM, DeepSearch with iterative refinement (DiR) achieves a lower distortion rate than BIM, as we discuss later in this section. We also mention our empirical observation that DeepSearch terminates in 3-4 iterations for the vast majority of input images (around 95%) for which DeepSearch finds adversarial examples.
For DeepSearch variants, we observe that iD is significantly more effective than sD. This confirms that the iterative version of DeepSearch (implemented in Alg. 2) is indeed effective in finding adversarial examples.
Results on average distortion rate. Our experimental results on the average distortion rate of the different techniques are shown in Fig. 5 .
As shown in the figure, only DeepSearch with single-step and iterative refinement (DsR and DiR) as well as BIM with logits loss (BIM-L) are effective in finding subtle adversarial examples, even more so when the L ∞ distance is large. For both MNIST and CIFAR-10, DeepSearch with iterative refinement achieves the lowest average distortion rate.
For both models, BIM-L achieves a lower distortion rate than DsR. However, DiR is even better than BIM-L. Specifically, for MNIST, when the L ∞ distance is between 0.15 and 0.4, the distortion rate of DiR is 2-3% lower than BIM-L. For CIFAR-10, the distortion rates are similar but slightly better for DiR. Overall, DeepSearch with iterative refinement is more effective in finding subtle adversarial examples than whitebox BIM. This is a notable result given that DiR (or iD) also matches the misclassification rate of BIM-L despite its blackbox nature.
In comparison to iD, DsR reduces the distortion rate significantly. For MNIST, when the L ∞ distance ranges from 0.15 to 0.4, DsR reduces the distortion rate by 3-22%. For the CIFAR-10 model and a distance range between 12 and 32, DsR reduces the distortion rate by 4-12%. These percentages are even higher for DiR. In particular, for MNIST, DiR reduces the distortion rate by 4-28%, and for CIFAR-10, by 5-13%. These results confirm the effectiveness of refinement (Alg. 3) in generating subtle adversarial examples.
Results on query reduction for DeepSearch. We now show how query reduction based on random grouping affects DeepSearch with iterative refinement (DiR). Figs. 6 and 7 show how different values of k (see Sect. 5.1) impact the misclassification rate and average distortion rate of our technique. In our setting, k may range from 1 to 256.
As shown in Fig. 6 , as k increases, the misclassification rate of DeepSearch decreases, and therefore, so does its effectiveness in finding adversarial examples. For example, for MNIST, when the L ∞ distance is between 0.1 and 0.4, the misclassification rate drops by 32-85% as k increases from 1 to 256. Similarly, for CIFAR-10, when the distance is between 4 to 32, the misclassification rate drops by 4-78%.
In Fig. 7 , the average distortion rate of DeepSearch increases for larger values of k, and thus, its effectiveness in generating subtle adversarial examples decreases. For example, for MNIST, when the L ∞ distance is between 0.2 and 0.4, there is a 4-20% increase in the distortion rate as k changes from 1 to 256. Similarly, for CIFAR-10, when the distance is between 4 and 32, the distortion rate increases by 1-4%.
Although the effectiveness of DeepSearch decreases as the value of k increases, the number of queries may still be reduced without compromising the advantage of DeepSearch over, say, whitebox FGSM. For example, for MNIST, when the distance is from 0.25 to 0.4 and k ≤ 16, DeepSearch still achieves a higher misclassification rate and a lower distortion rate than FGSM. The same holds for CIFAR-10 when the distance is from 16 to 32 and k ≤ 128.
Threats to Validity
We have identified the following three threats to the validity of our experiments.
Datasets and network models. Our experimental results may not generalize to other datasets or network models. However, we used two of the most popular datasets for image classification, MNIST and CIFAR-10. Moreover, our network models have very high test accuracy, 99.2% for LeNet-5 and 92.19% for ResNet-32.
Existing approaches. The second threat is related to the choice of existing approaches with which we compare. DeepSearch uses iterative linearization of non-linear networks and is tailored to the L ∞ distance metric. We, thus, compare with approaches that are similar in spirit.
Both FGSM and BIM perform linear perturbations of non-linear models and are optimized for the L ∞ distance. DeepFool [50] also uses linearization of networks, but it is optimized for the L 2 distance, so we do not compare with it.
Blackbox gradient-estimation methods [5] are more effective than other query-based blackbox techniques. We selected sGE for comparison because it may be more effective than FGSM (see Fig. 4 ). On the other hand, we omitted iterative gradient estimation because, when step α (see Sect. 5.1) is sufficiently small, the effectiveness of the approach should be comparable to BIM, with which we compare.
Fairness of comparison. The selection of parameters for each approach could affect the fairness of our comparison.
The number of iterations of BIM and iterative DeepSearch are not comparable; each iteration performs fundamentally different computations. We chose a bound for BIM that is sufficiently large for adversarial examples to reach the edge of the neighborhood around the original image. We set α = 1 as suggested by the authors of BIM.
In sGE, δ affects the precision of the gradient estimation. We set δ = 0.001, which is much more precise than the value chosen by the authors of sGE (δ = 0.01). 
RELATED WORK
Adversarial robustness. Szegedy et al. [68] first discovered adversarial examples in neural networks and used box-constrained L-BFGS to find adversarial examples. Since then, multiple whitebox adversarial attacks have been proposed: FGSM [24] , BIM [39] , DeepFool [50] , JSMA [55] , PGD [49] and C&W [12] . DeepSearch is closer to FGSM, BIM and DeepFool. Goodfellow et al. [24] first argued that the primary cause of adversarial examples is the linear nature of neural networks, and they proposed FGSM that allows fast generation of adversarial examples. BIM improved FGSM by extending it with iterative procedures. DeepFool [50] is another method that performs adversarial attacks through iterative linearization of neural networks. As a blackbox approach, DeepSearch differs with FGSM, BIM and DeepFool in its way to perform iterative search.
Blackbox adversarial attacks are more difficult than whitebox ones, and many blackbox attacks require a large number of queries. Papernot et al. [53, 54] explored blackbox attacks based on the phenomenon of transferability [53, 68] . Chen et al. [13] and Bhagoji et al. [5] proposed blackbox attacks based on gradient estimation [40, 65] . Uesato et al. [71] used SPSA [64] , and Ilyas et al. [32] used NES [59] . Narodytska et al. [51] performed a local-searched based attack. The boundary attack [6] only requires access to the final decision of neural networks. DeepSearch is closer to the work of Bhagoji et al. [5] (which approximates FGSM and BIM), but DeepSearch does not rely on gradient estimation.
Although research on developing adversarial attacks is moving fast, research on defending neural networks against adversarial attacks is relatively slow [1, 2, 9-12, 15, 20, 29, 46, 62] . Many defense techniques are shown to be ineffective soon after they have been developed. We refer to the work of Carlini et al. [8] for a more detailed discussion on evaluating adversarial robustness.
Testing deep neural networks. Recently, significant progress has been made on testing neural networks. Several useful test coverage criteria have been proposed to guide test case generation: DeepXplore [56] proposed neuron coverage and the first whitebox testing framework for neural networks; DeepGauge [47] proposed a set of finer-grained test coverage criteria; DeepCT [48] further proposed combinatorial test coverage for neural networks; Sun et al. [66] proposed coverage criteria inspired by MC/DC; Kim et al. [35] proposed surprise adequacy for deep learning systems. Sekhon et al. [60] and Li et al. [43] pointed out the limitation of existing structural coverage criteria for neural networks. Li et al. [60] also discussed improvements for better coverage criteria.
Moreover, Sun et al. [67] proposed the first concolic testing [22, 61] approach for neural networks. DeepCheck [26] tests neural networks based on symbolic execution [14, 36] . TensorFuzz [52] proposed the first framework of coverage-guided fuzzing for neural networks. DeepHunter [78] considered various mutation strategies for their fuzzing framework. Wicker et al. [74] extracted features from images and computed adversarial examples using a two-player turned-based stochastic game. DLFuzz [27] proposed the first differential fuzzing framework for deep learning systems. DeepTest [69] and DeepRoad [80] proposed testing tools for autonomous driving systems based on deep neural networks. For more on testing neural networks, we refer to the work of Zhang et al. [79] that surveys testing of machine-learning systems.
Formal verification of deep neural networks. Verification of neural networks is more challenging than testing. Early work [57] used abstract interpretation [16] to verify small-sized neural networks. Recent work [25, 34, 63] used SMT [3] techniques and considered new abstract domains.
Liu et al. [44] classified recent work into five categories: Reachabilityanalysis based approaches include MaxSens [77] , ExactReach [76] , and AI 2 [21] ; NSVerify [45] , MIPVerify [70] and ILP [4] are based on primal optimization; Duality [18] , ConvDual [75] and Certify [58] use dual optimization; Fast-Lin & Fast-Lip [73] , ReluVal [72] and DLV [31] combine reachability with search; Sherlock [17] , Reluplex [33] , Planet [19] and BaB [7] combine search with optimization. Lie et al. [44] provide a more detailed comparison and discussion on the above mentioned work.
CONCLUSION
We proposed and implemented DeepSearch, a novel blackboxfuzzing technique for testing deep neural networks. DeepSearch is simple and effective in finding adversarial examples with low distortion. To the best of our knowledge, DeepSearch is among the early approaches advancing blackbox fuzzing for neural networks.
